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Abstract The purpose of this paper is to independently evaluate the impact of the Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment regime on one particular public service, namely the provision of Council Tax and Housing Benefits 
distributed by local authorities throughout the course of the regime. This service was assessed in every iteration of 
the CPA methodologies and it included one of the few key performance indicators (KPIs) where the definition of 
the performance indicator, the means of collection and the public reporting of its results, remained the same 
throughout the CPA period between 2002 and 2008. 
The findings show that there were considerable and consistent improvements in benefits administration nationally 
within England and across all of its regions The paper then investigates a series of propositions. Whether there 
was any significant variations in the performance of larger as opposed to smaller authorities, or between 
predominantly rural authority areas and urban authorities or between authorities with different party political 
control. Finding no significant differences the research suggests implementation of the CPA regime itself appears 
to have had a catalytic effect upon the performance of the benefit administration services within local authorities 
throughout this period. The paper therefore concludes with a brief discussion as to whether the findings support 
the theoretical position of proponents of neo-institutionalism isomorphism or more traditional rational actor 
theories of public choice. 
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Introduction 
Since 1999 the Local Government (Best Value) Act has required local authorities and other 
public bodies to both achieve Best Value (BV) in all their activities and to facilitate the 
continual improvement in the performance of their organisations and the services they 
provide. Their performance was initially externally evaluated by a combination of long 
standing and newly created inspectorates, external auditors and ad hoc assessments through 
the production of Annual BV Performance Plans; the implementation of a system of national 
BV performance indicators, and through corporate and service inspections of BV Reviews. 
These inspections were carried out by the new Best Value Inspectorate, other national 
inspectorates such as Ofsted and the Social Services Inspectorate and the more recently 
established Benefits Fraud Inspectorate. Between 2002 and 2009 however the performance of 
all of England s local authorities was regularly externally assessed by the Audit Commission 
working collaboratively with the other external inspectorates under a performance 
management regime known as Comprehensive Performance Assessments (CPA). As its name 
implies this regime was intended to operate across every principle local authority in every 
part of the country and was intended to come to robust judgements about the economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness by which all local authorities delivered all their services and 
activities. This regime was in operation for seven years before it was superseded in April 
2009, for a single year, by the new performance management regime for local authorities and 
their key local delivery partners known as Comprehensive Area Assessments (CAA). 
The Audit Commission and the government published regular annual progress reports 
throughout the CPA regime and also published an overview of performance improvement 
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at the end of the regime (AC 2009). However, some recent academic commentators have 
pointed out that agencies such as the Audit Commission and the inspectorates have an interest 
in the “success” of the regime, as they need to demonstrate that their scrutiny of the system 
worked and therefore that services improved. There is a relatively recent and emerging body 
of academic literature related to CPA, largely set within a performance management 
framework devoted to assessing how either the system as a whole performed or which parts of 
the system have been the most effective in driving up improvements to public services 
(Andrews 2004, Andrews et al 2005, Game 2006, Wilson and Game 2004). Other evaluation 
has been undertaken by teams of academics sponsored by government departments (Martin 
and Bovaird 2005, Martin 2008 and AC 2009). It has also become increasingly commonplace 
to question whether CPA has had the impacts that the Audit Commission claims for it (Clarke 
2008). With the regime only recently coming to an end, the relatively robust national data 
available for benefits administration provides an excellent opportunity to contribute to this 
growing body of research, by studying the impact of the CPA on this particular service, to re-
assess the impact of the CPA regime. 
The purpose of this study. 
The purpose of this paper is therefore to independently evaluate the impact of CPA 
throughout the course of its history on one particular local authority service that was 
represented in every iteration of the CPA methodologies using one of the few key 
performance indicators (KPIs) where the definition of the performance indicator, the means of 
collection and the public reporting of its results remained the same throughout. The use and 
importance of this particular KPI was never challenged by either the local authorities, the 
auditors, the inspectors or the government in any consultation undertaken on the CPA. The 
raw data on the indicator existed and was collected nationally both prior to the CPA regime 
and was still being universally collected after CPA as part of the successor CAA . It now 
forms part of the “Right Time Indicator” of the DWP (DWP 2009a). This latter combines the 
average processing time for new claims with administration of changes of circumstances. In 
2008 there were changes made to the definition of the “changes in circumstances” which 
make the statistics non comparable overall, however the definitions applied to the KPI that we 
examined remained the same1. 
This particular performance indicator was collected and reported by the local authorities 
themselves, it is internally and externally audited, and was reported directly into the 
Department of Works and Pensions (DWP) on a quarterly basis with the results publicly 
available on the DWP website (DWP 2009a). The significance of this process lies in the fact 
that the external inspectorates, in this case the former Benefit Fraud Inspectorate and its 
successor, the Audit Commission, played no direct part in either its definition or collection. 
Finally it was very rare (but not unknown) for all those involved in the policy and delivery of 
a service to be able to identify a single key indicator that the vast majority of the community 
of delivery organisations, stakeholders and interested parties agreed is the one key indicator 
that is a reasonable proxy for the performance of the overall service. Performance indicator 
PM1 “the average time for processing new claims” has always been the first indicator in 
every version of the performance regime for the benefits administration and is commonly 
accepted as being such a proxy for the performance of the Council Tax and Housing Benefits 
Service (CT and HB) in the same way that the life expectancy (through the “all age all cause 
mortality” indicator) is accepted within the health community. It is for these reasons and 
because of the veracity of the evidential base that we have adopted it as the barometer of 
performance. As such, this organisational field is felt to be appropriate to consider the 
1
 The DWP website refers to changes to definitions and the collection regime making comparisons of 
results incomparable. This is true of the results as a whole but not to the part of the regime that we 
investigated. DWP also accepts that the figures are in any case suitable for investigating long term high 
level trends, which is the objective of this study. 
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organisational responses to the CPA regime (Bovaird 2008) and, inter alia, the impact the 
CPA may have had on performance improvement within the service. 
By analysing performance of this single service, we were seeking to establish two findings. 
Firstly to what extent did service performance improve during the CPA regime? Secondly, 
could improved service level performance be linked to the presence of CPA as a catalytic 
trigger (Osborne et al 1995) whereby the comprehensive and inclusive nature of the CPA 
assessment and its highly “visible” publication, raised the profile of this single measure 
within organisations and across the intra-organisational professional field. 
The CPA, as with other performance measurement regimes, can be considered to operate as a 
socially constructed view of relative organisational performance (Osborne et al 1995) and as 
such the ways in which organisations have responded to the CPA in the past, and any 
subsequent change in service delivery, can be seen from either Neo-Institutionalism and/or 
rational actor theoretical perspectives (McSweeney and Duncan 1998, O Shea 2007, 
Wayenberg 2006, DiMaggio and Powell 1991, Goldman 2005). Whether responses were 
provoked by a proverbial „carrot or stick is likely to vary across organisations, depending 
inter alia on their relative performance at the start of the CPA process and/or their political 
support for the government introducing the new regime. Similarly, factors such as 
organisational size, political control and urban/rurality could also have had an impact or 
organisational response, outside of the CPA trigger (Andrews et al 2005). This study will 
consider the potential impact of these and other factors as well as briefly discussing the 
potential for neo-institutionalised isomorphism, given that the CPA regime generated both 
incentives for improving performance and sanctions for poor performance. However, in a 
wider context, such speculation may only provide a useful insight for further research into 
organisational responses to CPA and to successor performance regimes. 
The Council Tax and Housing Benefits Services within Local Authorities 
Housing Benefit (HB) was introduced by the government in April 1993 and is an income 
related benefit designed to help people on low incomes pay for rented accommodation 
whether they are in or out of work. Council Tax Benefit (CTB) was also introduced in April 
1993 and is an income related benefit calculated in a similar way to Housing Benefit which 
has been designed to help people on low incomes pay their local council tax. There are 
currently approximately 4.5 million people in receipt of housing benefit with an average 
receipt of over £80 per week while 5.5 million households are in receipt of council tax benefit 
receiving an average of approximately £15 per week. Together they represent the 
redistribution of income of over £220m per year to the some of the poorest people in our 
communities (DWP 2009a). 
The administration of the payment of CTB and HB is usually undertaken by a team in the 
treasury or financial services department of “all-purpose” or “unitary” local authorities (such 
as London Boroughs, Metropolitan and Unitary Authorities) and by the district councils 
within those parts of the country where there are still county and district authorities in the 
two-tier system of local government. In 2002 there were 115 single tier authorities and 238 
districts administering the benefits. Some partial local government reorganisation between 
2006 and April 2009 changed the numbers of administering authorities to 124 and 201 
respectively by the end of the CPA regime period. The County Councils played no part in the 
delivery of this particular service and are therefore not part of this assessment. 
Figure 1 below attempts to depict a simplified model for the resourcing and operation of the 
process for administering and determining applications for CTB and HB payments in local 
authorities in terms of the constituent inputs and outputs of the service. 
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The payment and entitlements that CTB and HB applicants are entitled to from the system are 
established nationally and the objectives of the service are essentially the same in every 
authority. These are to process all claims quickly, accurately, efficiently and economically; to 
ensure prompt payment and to provide a responsive service which minimises fraud and pays 
all entitlements to all those qualifying. In July 2002 the government set this out and formally 
introduced a new “Benefit Verification Framework” (DWP 2002) to ensure that benefits are 
paid to those who need them, and at the same time making sure that the system is secure from 
fraud. The new framework set out new procedures and instructions on how claims for council 
tax benefits and housing benefits should be dealt with. It has strict rules that every council has 
to abide by and requires that every person claiming benefit has to provide original and 
verifiable documentation relating to identity, income, savings and capital. In order to facilitate 
this new (and tougher) system new “standard” benefit forms and new computer software 
systems were installed and implemented prior to April 2002. Similarly in order to prepare for 
such a fundamental change in the system the government had to give councils and their 
partners and stakeholders considerable notice of the proposed changes and had therefore 
undertaken a national information campaign over the preceding three years. Following the 
Comprehensive Spending Review of 2002 and as part of the implementation of CPA the 
DWP provided discretionary grants to Local Authorities between 2002 and 2006 from a 
“Standardisation” fund to assist the implementation of the new verification framework. 
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate (BFI) was officially launched in November 1997, in response 
to government concerns about the estimated levels of fraud and attacks being made on the 
social security system (BFI 2007). However as part of CPA the role of the BFI changed 
significantly to assess the performance of the benefits services as well as to detect and deter 
fraud in the system. The BFI therefore existed formally as part of the CPA regine until April 
2008 when the responsibility for the inspection and assessment of CTB and HB transferred to 
the Audit Commission in England, and the Wales Audit Office and Audit Scotland in the 
devolved administrative areas. 
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Although there have been some minor changes to the benefits administration systems and 
processes between 2002 and 2009 essentially the process has remained the same throughout 
the country throughout this period. In order to measure progress in providing better quality 
services and demonstrate comparative value for money a system of performance indicators 
and benchmarking standards for the benefits service where also established. However most 
of the benchmarks and standards used where either pre-existing or were amendments to 
existing performance indicators rather than being completely new indicators. 
The monitoring of the administration of new claims and the antecedents of the 
Performance Indicator PM1. 
Although some individual service performance indicators were being developed by the Audit 
Commission immediately after its establishment in 1983, the commission started regular 
annual collection and publication of suites of national indicators in the 1990s with the first of 
their annual publications relating to the 1993/94 financial year (AC 1995). From 1993/94 the 
national indicator sets have always included data on the payment of HB and CTB, although at 
various times they have been called Audit Commission National Indicators, Best Value 
Performance Indicators, and more recently the “Housing Benefit and Council Tax Claims 
Administration Quarterly Performance Data”. Since the publication of the results for 2003/04 
these have been published quarterly on the Department of Works and Pensions website rather 
than in written reports. 
From 1993/94 there were eight benefit indicators collected and these included G1b and G2b 
which where “the percentage of new claims that were processed within 14 days of receipt” 
with the two indicators merely distinguishing between the two types of benefits. In 1996/97 
two of the eight indicators were dropped but the remaining six, including the percentage 
processed within 14 days, were retained but were re-designated G1 and G2. 
In 1999/2000 the suite of national benefits indicators were expanded to a total of 11 and G1 
and G2 changed to the “average time for processing new claims” rather than the percentage 
paid within 14 days. Finally in 2000/01, newly re-numbered as BVPI 78a and with a tighter 
much more precise definition imposed, the commission collected “the average time taken for 
processing all new claims” conflating the statistics for both types of benefits into one 
indicator. Although this was later rebadged as PM1, the definition and quarterly collection of 
this indicator has remained the same since April 2000 and therefore the same throughout the 
CPA period from April 2002 to April 2009. 
In April 2006 changes were made to the way the performance of the authorities was presented, 
effectively to bring it into line with the way performance is assessed under the Housing 
Benefit – Council Tax Performance Standards (DWP 2009b). Prior to 2006 an authority s 
performance was classified into one of four quartiles which produced a relative measure of 
performance. In 2006 the quartiles for each of the performance measures were superseded by 
grade ranges assessed against absolute benchmarks and these determined the standard of 
performance in each of the indicators with a score of 1 to 4 as follows 
4 Excellent Less than 30 days 
3 Good 30-36 days 
2 Meeting minimum standards 36-48 days 
1 Not meeting minimum standards. over 48 days 
PM1 measures the average processing time in calendar days across all new claims for which 
the date of the full and final decision is made within that quarter. An excellent performance 
would mean the average processing time is less than 30 days; a good performance will be 
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between 30 and 36 days; authorities are deemed to be meeting minimum standards if 
performance is within the 36 to 48 day range and they are not meeting minimum standards if 
their average processing time exceeds 48 days. PM1 is therefore an output indicator rather 
than an input or outcome indicator. The “outcomes” of its administration, while very 
important, both to the recipients and to wider poverty and income distribution within local 
communities do not significantly affect the performance of the distributing authority. 
PM1 was effectively reported as a relational indicator prior to 2006 but has since been 
assessed against the Housing Benefits-Council Tax Performance Standards which translates it 
into an absolute and standards based indicator. Fortunately as the raw data is also available on 
the DWP website it is possible to retrospectively re-calibrate and compare the performance of 
authorities between 2002 and 2006 against the current standards which is what we have done. 
Some methodological and data issues. 
The data was collected by the local authorities and aggregated by the DWP. Covering 6 years 
is sufficient to produce a comparative longitudinal study over almost all of the lifespan of 
CPA. All of the information is publicly available, there are no issues over sensitivity or 
confidentiality and some summarised analysis has already been done at the national level by 
the Audit Commission (Audit Commission 2001 and 2009) which provides some reassurance 
or support to our research conclusions. The data is being used for the purpose for which it was 
originally collected, namely assessing comparative performance over time, and between local 
authority providers of the service. It was being used within a performance management 
framework which itself had been the subject of considerable consultation between the 
Government, the Audit Commission, the Local Authorities and all key stakeholders (AC 
2009). 
However, it is necessary to be aware of the significant methodological developments within 
the CPA framework between 2002 and 2009 and to be mindful that while generalisations 
about service improvement may be possible from the dataset across all delivery authorities 
over the lifecycle of CPA, some of the more detailed analysis may only be verifiable within 
the two organisational subsets of Unitary Authorities and District Authorities to which 
alternative CPA methodologies were applied. Similarly although there was no change to the 
collection and definition of the PM1 indicator over the CPA period there were significant 
changes to both the Unitary Authorities CPA methodology, as well as the District CPA 
methodology between 2005 and 2006 respectively (AC 2005). The importance or internal 
weightings ascribed to particular parts of the methodology, pieces of information or 
individual assessments therefore changed within these overall methodologies, and we must 
accept, at least the possibility of these changes influencing the detailed analysis and 
(potentially) our conclusions. However the weighting ascribed to the benefits services, unlike 
some other services, were only minimally affected by the changes within both the unitary 
authorities methodology and the districts methodology. 
The second major issue usually identified when using official statistics from government 
departments or their agencies, is the problem of validity. Validity issues arise when inferences 
are drawn about the relationship between data in the data set when in fact other factors or 
events not captured by the data set have been responsible for the changes or impact. In this 
particular case more detailed research will need to examine whether any significant long term 
changes might have occurred to these variables without CPA such as changes to the numbers 
of people employed by the authorities in these roles, further changes to the technology utilised 
by authorities, or changes to the financial investment in benefits administration by the 
authorities (either individually or collectively) to assess whether these played a significant 
part in any improvement change or impact on performance. Finally as the benefits 
administration system partially relies on sources of information and advice from third parties 
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such as the other benefit providers2 and applicants for benefits often seek and receive 
guidance and support from advice agencies such as the Citizens Advice Bureau. Future 
research may therefore need to ask whether changes or improvements to, these contributing 
agencies could account for any changes in the performance of benefits administration services 
over the CPA period. 
We acknowledge that no definitive conclusions can be drawn on any of these potential 
external factors without further, more specific, research but during the course of our study, we 
discovered no sustained nor significant changes in any of these external resources in the 
course of our investigations sufficient for us to question our overall conclusions. 
The National Performance April 2002 to April 2009 and some selected regional analysis 
The five graphs below show the overall performance of authorities over six of the seven years 
of CPA. During this time not all authorities managed to submit their individual returns on 
time for each quarter so it is not possible to report on either a “true” national or regional 
average from the published data. However in order to assess the long term overall 
performance the graphs below plot the performance of the best (reported) authority, the worst 
authority and the performance of the median authority between April 2002 and March 2009, 
both nationally and specifically in terms of three regions. As this is ordinal data, medians 
have been used to demonstrate long term trends rather than means as the latter is impossible 
for the authors to calculate. 
Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 National and Regional Performance of national indicator PM1 
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2
 This is principally Jobcentre Plus and HMRC who provide employment and other non housing and 
council tax benefits to an overlapping set of “customers” 
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It is clear from these graphs that authorities improved their performance fairly consistently 
overall throughout the whole period of CPA. Although there will always be a greater 
tendency for the poorer performing authorities to fail to return their performance on time (for 
obvious reasons the best performing authorities appear to have consistently reported their 
performance on time and subsequent quarterly “adjustments” were consistent minor 
downward adjustments), nevertheless the reported performance of the worst performing 
authority fell from a high of 174 days to 57 days over this period and the performance of the 
median authority improved from 44 days to 25 days. By way of comparison, in the pre-CPA 
year of Best Value in 2000/01 when the definition of PM1 was the same as under CPA, 9 out 
of 33 London Boroughs took in excess of 100 days on average for PM1 with Hackney, taking 
on average 205 days (DWP 2009b). Clearly the BV regime was not delivering the significant 
improvements later witnessed under CPA. 
Did the size, type, urban/rural nature or political control of authorities make any 
significant difference? 
Previous studies within the literature on local government performance management have 
examined the impact other factors such as size, type, urban/rural nature or political control 
ma have had on organisational performance (Andrews et al 2005, Communities and Local 
Government 2010). In order to explore in more detail these results and to see if there was any 
significant variations between large authorities and small authorities, or between 
predominantly rural authority areas and urban authorities and/or between authorities with 
different political controls (Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat or “No Overall Control”), 
the authors have also looked at individual authority performance in three regions of England 
for which consistent and comparable data is available. 
Figure 6 Median Values of national indicator PM1 within England; and in 3 Regions 
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The regions examined were London, the East Midlands and Yorkshire and Humberside. 
These three regions were chosen because they allow us to make the comparisons highlighted 
above and because these were, uniquely, the only three regions that were not subject to any 
form of local government boundary changes or administrative reorganisation between 2002 
and 2009 as a result of the opportunity for voluntary structural changes afforded by part 1 of 
the local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007. In other words the 
responsibilities and the boundaries of all of the authorities remained exactly the same and 
there were no significant disruptions to their organisational context throughout the study 
period. 
Coincidently, these three regions were highly appropriate for this particular study. London is 
an area with comprehensive coverage of “all-purpose” or unitary urban authorities. The East 
Midlands is the region with the smallest number and proportion of unitary authorities (4) and 
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the highest number and proportion of small district authorities, having 13 of its authorities 
serving host populations of less than 85,000 residents. This is the size of authority at which 
“4th Option” Governance arrangements were allowed to continue under the Local Government 
Act 2000. Yorkshire and Humberside is one of those regions in the middle with 14 unitary 
authorities and 7 District Councils delivering CTB and HB services. The results for each of 
the three regions are shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3 below. The figures shown represent the 
number of days individual authorities on average took to register a claim. The shading 
represents their performance against the CTB and HB Performance Standards referred to 
above and both give a very graphic representation of the significant improvements in the 
service to claimants over the CPA period. 
These results also demonstrate that the type of authority again has had surprisingly little 
impact on the levels of improvement achieved. There is as much variation in the performance 
of the three different types of authorities, London Boroughs, Unitary Authorities and District 
Councils as there is within their individual groups as there is between types of authority. 
Table 1 The performance of London authorities 2002-2008 when compared to the CT 
and HB Performance Standards introduced in 2006 
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Table 2 The performance of East Midlands authorities 2002-2008 when compared to the 
CT and HB Performance Standards introduced in 2006. 
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Table 3 The performance of Yorkshire and Humberside authorities 2002-2008 when 
compared to the CT and HB Performance Standards introduced in 2006 
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Throughout the CPA regime there has been little difference in the main political parties 
attitude to the regime with the national Local Government Association (which includes all 
authorities) maintaining a largely bi-partisan approach throughout the whole period. The 
national results clearly show that the nature of the political control of an authority has had 
surprisingly little influence on performance and figure 7 illustrates this by showing the 
political control of the authorities with the best and worst performance in each year over the 
CPA period. The table also shows the political control of the best and worst performing 
authorities in each of the three regions referred to above. 
Mann-Whitney 3tests have been carried out to establish whether there are significant 
differences between those authorities that remained in Labour control throughout the time 
period or those that remained in Conservative control.4 These tests establish that the median 
times of the Labour controlled authorities were significantly higher than the Conservative 
authorities in 02/03 but that there was no significant difference between the reductions in 
median times between 02/03 and 07/08 and there is also no significant difference between the 
median times of the Labour and Conservative authorities in 07/08. 
3
 Mann-Whitney U tests are used to test the difference between the medians with an approximately 
95% confidence interval 
4
 There were only two authorities from the three regions evaluated that remained in Liberal Democrat 
control throughout the evaluation period and therefore the Liberal Democrat authorities have been 
omitted from this analysis 
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Figure 7 Party Political Control of the best and worst performing authorities during 
2002 to 2008 
In order to compare rural authorities with urban authorities we have taken predominantly rural 
authorities as those authorities who are members of the former Local Government 
Association affiliated group reserved for the 50 authorities that represented the “most sparsely 
populated areas” of England and compared these to those authorities with only urban or built 
up areas within their administrative boundaries. This latter group is not just the London 
Boroughs but includes for example the relevant cities and suburban authorities in the other 
two regions. Mann-Whitney tests and figure 8 below are therefore based upon the results from 
the 46 urban authorities and 20 rural authorities listed in the footnote . The Mann-Whitney 
tests demonstrate that reductions in median times for both rural and urban authorities between 
the years 02/03 and 07/08 is significant. Figure 8 below shows that whether the authority was 
rural or urban had little impact upon the trend of reduction in payment times achieved 
although a Mann-Whitney test does demonstrate that the reduction in the median time in 
urban authorities is significantly higher than those in rural authorities . 
Figure 8 Urban and Rural authorities 2002-2008 East Midlands, London and Yorkshire 
and Humberside 
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We also compared large authorities with small authorities to see if there were any significant 
differences between these groups. Large authorities are defined as those having both large 
resident populations to serve and large budgets with which to serve them. We therefore 
defined large authorities as those serving populations of over 200,000 (there are no district 
authorities serving populations in excess of 200,000) and net revenue budgets in excess of 
£250m in 2002/03. We defined small authorities as being those 4th Option authorities serving 
populations of less than 85,000 and with a 2002/03 budget of less than £25m in 2002/03. In 
London not even the City of London Corporation falls within the smaller category and 21 of 
the 33 London Boroughs fall into the large authority category. In the East Midlands 15 
authorities fall into the smaller authorities category and 3 into the larger authorities category 
while in Yorkshire and Humberside 10 fall into the larger and 4 into the smaller categories. 
Figure 9 below and the Mann-Whitney U tests are based upon the results from 34 large and 
20 small authorities and helps to demonstrate how the performance of the service is not 
directly dependent on the size of the authority. The Mann-Whitney tests demonstrate that 
reduction in median times for both small and large authorities between the years 02/03 and 
07/08 is significant. However they also show that the reduction in median times within the 
larger authorities is significantly higher than the those within the smaller authorities. 
Figure 9 Large and Small authorities 2002-2008 East Midlands, London and Yorkshire 
and Humberside. 
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Conclusions 
There was sustained and significant improvement in the performance of the CTB and HB 
services administered by local authorities throughout the CPA period and this significant 
improvement occurred irrespective of the size or type of authority, the nature of the political 
control of authorities or the urban or rural nature of the administrative areas. This 
improvement was mirrored by general improvement of local government services throughout 
the CPA period which shows that the improvement in benefits was not achieved at the 
expense of other services (AC 2009). 
The significant improvements in the outputs of the benefits administration system do not 
appear to have been the result of significant increases in the inputs to the system, and even if 
evidence could be provided of this, there is a strong possibility that this could also be 
attributed to the external trigger for performance improvement arising from the introduction 
of the CPA regime. After the implementation of the new verification framework and 
notwithstanding the support from the DWP Standardisation Fund between 2002 and 2006 
there was no substantial improvements in information technology or in the resources applied 
by either local authorities or other parties outside of local authorities that are (albeit indirectly) 
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involved in the process. There will clearly have been individual changes to the input mix in 
all authorities, but improvement essentially came about and was sustained because of 
improvements in knowledge and knowledge transfer, because of the way with which 
resources were applied and better inter-related and because the CPA regime itself acted as a 
catalyst, a motivator and a supporting infrastructure for widespread service improvement. 
It is reasonable to claim that the improvements in the services by almost all English local 
authorities over this period represented sustained and widespread improvements over a whole 
service sector or organisational field. In these circumstances and in terms of the theory of 
organisational change, we would contend that the CPA regime itself acted as the “change 
agent” for the system as a whole. Taking this a stage further and looking forward to further 
potential studies, our findings suggest that institutional isomorphism operated at the service 
level. Such theoretical interpretations have been used in the past to explore the development 
of new public management (NPM) (McSweeney and Duncan 1998, O Shea 2007), local 
government modernization (Wayenberg 2006) and political decision making (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991a, Goldman 2005). Institutional isomorphic change can arise due to three 
potentially interrelated mechanisms: coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991) which are now widely adopted by social scientists (Currie 2009). 
Coercive isomorphism implies the presence of some external force or organisation (a higher 
level of government for example or the imposition of CPA) and may be both formal and 
informal. Mimetic isomorphism uses the modelling (or benchmarking) of other organisations 
within the field in order to imitate innovation, whereas normative isomorphism results from 
the gradual professionalisation of an organisation or service over time. Furthermore, 
isomorphism could be the result of individuals or organisations responding rationally, to 
uncertainty; to sanctions or constraints; or to institutional rewards both financial or regulatory 
(all of which were present in the governments CPA regime), leading to cross-organisational 
homogeneity (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Currie 2009). It could therefore be interpreted that 
improvements in service delivery across the sector were a result of such forces for change. 
The trigger for change may be interpreted as coercive due to the external pressure of the CPA 
and the “visibility” of performance this brought at the corporate or political level; mimetic 
through the active modelling or benchmarking of good local authorities by the DWP, or 
normative through the increased professionalisation of the service over time either through 
employee transfer between organisations, the influx, through outsourcing, of large corporate 
service providers or the transference of skills through the mimetic process. There is also the 
possibility that such isomorphic change represented a progression through each of the three 
mechanisms as a result of rational decision making, not least in those organisations that were 
originally very poorly performing. At this stage the theoretical interpretation of the findings 
are inconclusive and would require further investigation through a more interpretivist study, 
using case studies and interviews, to establish the causes underlying the improvement in 
performance in individual authorities. It may be that there has been a shift in performance 
through punctuated equilibrium, characterised by periods of stasis or incremental change, 
punctuated by large scale change episodes (Bovaird 2008). If this was the case, then the CPA, 
as an overarching and highly visible performance management framework, may indeed have 
acted as both an inter-organisational and intra-organisational catalytic trigger (Osborne et al 
1995). Notwithstanding these possibilities, our study suggests that the implementation of 
CPA and the inclusion of the performance of the Benefits Services within CPA acted as a 
coercive trigger that promoted a combination of both mimetic and normative isomorphism 
across the service leading to widespread sustainable improvements in the services to 
claimants. 
Notes 
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3 Authorities defined respectively as “urban” and “rural” authorities in the East Midlands, and Yorkshire and 
Humberside. 
a) The East Midlands rural group (13) comprises Rutland, Melton and Harborough in Leicestershire; Newark and 
Sherwood in Nottinghamshire; Derbyshire Dales and High Peak in Derbyshire; East Lindsay West Lindsay North 
Kesteven, South Kesteven and South Holland in Lincolnshire and Daventry and South Northamptonshire in 
Northamptonshire. The urban group (8) includes Nottingham, Derby and Leicester unitary authorities but also 
Chesterfield BC, Mansfield DC, Oadby and Wigston BC, Lincoln CC and Northampton BC. 
b) In Yorkshire and Humberside the rural group (7) includes Craven, East Riding of Yorkshire, Harrogate, 
Hambleton, Richmonshire, Rydale and Selby while the urban group (5) includes Hull, Leeds, Sheffield, Rotherham, 
and York 
4 Authorities defined respectively as “large” and “small” authorities 
c) Large London Boroughs (21) – Barnet, Croydon, Ealing, Bromley, Wandsworth, Lambeth, Enfield, Hillingdon, 
Brent Lewisham Redbridge, Southwark, Westminster, Newham, Havering, Waltham Forest Haringey, Bexley, 
Greenwich, Harrow and Hounslow. 
d) Large East Midland authorities (3) – Nottingham Derby and Leicester 
e) Small East Midlands authorities (16) – Bolsover, South Derbyshire, Derbyshire Dales; Corby, Daventry, East 
Northants, Kettering, South Northants, Wellingborough; Boston, Lincoln City, West Lindsay South Holland, 
Harborough Melton and Oadby and Wigston. 
f) Large Y&H authorities (10) – Leeds, Sheffield, Bradford, Kirklees, Wakefield, East Riding, Doncaster, Hull, 
Rotherham and Barnsley 
g) Small Y&H authorities (4) – Rydale, Richmondshire, Craven and Selby 
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